Much of the material included in this article is taken from a presentation copy of Occupation of Matabeleland: A Souvenir that was prepared by the Fortieth Anniversary Celebration Committee. There were celebrations in November 1933, forty years since the occupation of Matabeleland.

The two articles that form the basis of this article are Breaking the Power of Lobengula and When Fort Victoria demanded War on the Matabele; both cover much of the same ground and are also included in more detailed accounts on this website.

On 5 October 1893 Dr Jameson was authorised[1] to invade Matabeleland. On the 4 November of the same year what is now Bulawayo was occupied, the Chartered Company’s flag flying from the ruins of Lobengula's kraal.

Between these dates a thrilling chapter of the country (present-day Zimbabwe) was written. There were many in 1893 who shook their heads when they realised what was contemplated. They called it a desperate military adventure and pointed anxiously to the prospect of defeat, a defeat that would have brought white settlement of the country to a rapid conclusion. Yet war was inevitable. With shield and assegai the Matabele were threatening Mashonaland. The Mashonas had taken refuge in the kopjes. In the Victoria district kraals were being burnt to the ground. White farmers, traders and prospectors were demanding protection. One writer described the situation, “The people of Victoria had pointed out to Jameson that they must either fight or shut up shop.” They knew that unless they fought it would be impossible to stay on in Mashonaland leaving the Matabele free to kill and plunder at will.

The demand for war to halt amaNdebele raiding grows

The people of Victoria were demanding war against the Matabele - immediate war - for the raiders had actually murdered Mashona natives in the streets of Victoria and had by their daring thrown the whole district into a state of alarm.[2]

Victoria itself was under arms and men were at their posts day and night. A report in the Matabeleland Times  of 26 July 1893 states, “As the Matabele are still seen in the district, burning every kraal they come to and stealing cattle belonging to white men…it is necessary that some decisive steps should be taken.”

The administrator Dr Jameson ordered the Matabele to send in their Indunas and when they came, he demanded that they should leave for the Matabele border within an hour. At the expiration of that time a mounted party under Captain Lendy rode out, falling in with 150 of the warriors, opened fire on them, killing about 30. The remainder bolted over the border.[3]

But Victoria did not for a moment imagine that it had seen the last of the Matabele raiders. They had good reason to believe that Lobengula's fighting men would return in still greater numbers, and therefore the demand for war was urged with ever increasing emphasis. Speakers at the public meeting had to counsel patience and the following committee was elected to place the facts of the situation before Dr Jameson. Dr Sauer, Mr I. Sonnenberg,[4] Lieutenants Bastard, Napier, Slater and Reid. The resolutions adopted at the public meeting thanked the British South Africa Company for the prompt action taken “to remove the threat and danger caused by the presence of so large a body of Matabele in such close proximity to the town and murdering natives in the employ of the inhabitants.” They urged upon the administration, “the absolute necessity of taking the present favourable opportunity for settling once for all this (the Matabele) question.”

Another passage in this historic address reads, “In the first place the committee appointed yesterday are requested, in the most emphatic manner possible, to inform you that they have no further belief in the promises given or made by Lobengula…Lobengula has broken his word once more in crossing a forbidden boundary and having so done, they know that any promises made by him as to future delimitation of his raiding areas are not in any way to be trusted…the indunas have admitted that neither they nor the King can control the young bloods of the Matabele impi’s.”

The committee gave a number of striking illustrations of the effects of the Matabele raids, instancing how industry had been paralysed, cold-blooded murders committed among the Shona natives employed by the settlers, wanton destruction of crops and the carrying-off of livestock. White farmers’ losses in one raid alone were reported as having been: 450 cows and oxen, 280 sheep and goats, 10 asses and 15 pigs. In many cases farmers lost everything they had. The resolution proceeded, “They (the farmers) state most emphatically that as they fully believe these raids will be of yearly occurrence, that they are fearful not only of losing cattle and crops in the future, but the very grave probability of themselves, their wives and children being murdered as well as their natives. That such is a probability none can deny, for each years raiding has found the impi’s to be more determined and ferocious than the last.”

Transport was disorganised and business generally at a standstill. In Victoria there were some who spoke of returning to the South; here were others stating their full determination of taking the matter into their own hands and themselves avenging their losses.

Next day the committee presented the resolution to Doctor Jameson who said he was awaiting a reply from Lobengula. He was also expecting the High Commissioner's approval for the institution of active measures towards the suppression of the high-handed action and raids of the Matabele. Meantime, he said every precaution had been taken and preparations were being made for prompt action if required.

The Victoria Resolution made the desired impression in high quarters and on the 24 July a lengthy telegram from the High Commissioner, Sir Henry Locke, was received, assuring the public of Mashonaland, “that Mr Rhodes, as representing the Chartered Company, is quite alive to the necessity of preventing the progress and civilization that has already been established from being checked by any periodical raids of the Matabele.”

The settlers were not ready to make war upon the Matabele and the High Commissioner in his reply stressed this, pointing out that with the upmost expedition the requisite number of horses could not be at Victoria sooner than two months from the present date. Again, patience was demanded and the reply to the threat to take matters into their own hands was a reminder that, “a question of such importance as making war on the Matabele must be left to the decision of the authorities as to the policy to be pursued, the time to be selected should the necessity arise, and the manner in which it is conducted.”

The High Commissioner gave the assurance that the authorities, “are fully alive to the urgency of the situation and will not be backward in taking action that will secure, not only the present, but the future safety of the country” and concluded with the following: “As to the rumours of men leaving Mashonaland in consequence of what has happened, I cannot believe there any such far-North trekkers, who at the first breath of difficulty or danger would think of leaving the country. Should, however, there be any such, then, in my opinion, the country would not suffer by their departure.”

Victoria did not rush into war at that juncture. The necessity for careful preparation was fully appreciated and when at long last the order to advance was given, the men of Victoria were ready, and they gave a truly magnificent account of themselves.

Some of the prominent leaders of the Salisbury and Victoria Columns

                                               Lobengula

                             Sir John Wiloughby                                                                                              Dr L.S. Jameson

                                    P.W. Forbes                                                                                                    Allan Wilson

Preparation for a confrontation

Dr Jamison's own view was that, “if we are to remain in Mashonaland, we must settle the Matabele question once and for all.” His plan was that there should be four Columns that converged on Matabeleland:

1. Salisbury Column under Major P.W. Forbes
2. Victoria Column under Major Allan Wilson
3. Colonel Goold-Adams with the Bechuanaland Border Police
4. Commandant Raaff and Khama III’s men

On these lines the war was carried through.

Extracts from the 1893 diary of D.G. Gisborne of Filabusi

The Salisbury and Victoria Columns joined forces at Iron Mine Hill where Dr Jameson then awaited authority to “settle the Matabele question once and for all.” In time that authority came. A patrol of the Bechuanaland Border Police (BBP) had been fired on at the Shashi river by a party of about thirty Matabele. The High Commissioner, Sir Henry Loch, hesitated no longer.

It was war and the diary reads, Laager was immediately broken up and a two mile trek made. In the afternoon another trek of four miles completed the day’s march. Next morning trekking was continued and the Umniati river crossed about 8am.

Trekking continued and on 11 October the Sebakwe river is crossed.

On the March a sable antelope was shot by the advance guard and brought into camp by the boys. At the outspan half an eland was found, killed the previous night by lions, and secured for rations. Just before sunset we went into laager on the banks of the Bembeswane river. A fatigue of B Troop was sent out to cut reeds for the horses. The river was crossed next morning. Drift being bad B Troop fixed a rope and helped to pull the wagons across.

On the 15th we read that 20 men from each troop were ordered to ride out in a search for cattle. A mob of 240 head was secured. News was brought in that Captain John Alexander Livingston Campbell, a magistrate of Mashonaland, had been wounded in an attempt to surround three or four cattle. Twenty men of B Troop saddled up and escorted a Scotch cart to fetch Campbell in. They met  men carrying Campbell in a litter. Dr Jameson decided that it was necessary to amputate Campbell's leg, which operation he performed before sundown.

Further on there is a sad entry. We heard the bad news of Campbell's death. He was the first man to fall in the campaign.[5]

Later on scouts came in and reported that Matabele had been seen two miles ahead of the laager retreating with their cattle. So I was sent out with a despatch for Snodgrass warning him to look out for fear of an attack. Any moment now, we imagine the conflict will be in full swing. But the Matabele continue to fall back. Then comes the news that a military kraal, 15 miles north, is said to be inhabited by a large impi and at midnight, forces are ordered to attack the kraal. Major Allan Wilson has 140 men with him and Captain Heany is his subordinate. We reached the kraal at about 6am, the Maxim opened fire from a commanding position and the troops in skirmishing order of half sections advanced in line to surround the kraal and prevent the Matabele getting off free. Unfortunately, the kraal was found to be deserted. A disappointment, but after breakfast the men had the satisfaction of burning the kraal before rejoining the Column.

On the 23^rd, the diary reports another tragedy. Burnett had been badly wounded at a kraal seven miles off. For men from A and B Troops accompanied Gifford, Dr Jameson, Doctor Edgelow and Willoughby. They galloped under Gifford’s guidance for about six miles but failed to find Burnett and his party. Searched around  til dusk and then returned to laager by moonlight. Found on arrival that Burnett[6] had died on the way in and that his body had been brought in. He was buried the same night.

24 October 1893 the Shangani River has been crossed without opposition. All went well that night, but just before Reveille the camp was aroused by the pickets firing. We found that the Matabele had attacked the outposts to recover their cattle which they succeeded in driving off. Then they made a general attack on the laagers and completely surrounded us, but the heavy fire from our laagers prevented them coming close. The fight lasted about an hour when the Matabele retired firing. Mounted troops were then sent out from our three Troops and hastened their retreat. About 11am everything appeared quiet. Three men in the Salisbury Column and a similar number in the Victoria Column were wounded. The Matabele thereafter were found scattered about in parties, each numbering a few hundred. The advance and flanking parties from the Columns engaged them but in most cases had to return for want of support.[7]

Just before sundown, laager was hurriedly formed, far from water, and a scene of confusion lasted for some time owing to an attack by the enemy. It was then found that Captain Gwynedd Williams,[8] formerly of the Royal Horse Guards, who commanded the Scouts was missing, his horse (Buluwayo) having bolted with him towards the enemy's lines. That was on 26 October. That day one of the men of the Victoria Column wounded in the Shangani fight, died.

Next morning an early start was made and the column trekked on in search of water, camping after a 5-mile trek at about 10am. During the trek the column was harassed on the right flank by bodies of natives who attacked the flanking party in force and necessitated a temporary laager being formed. C Troop fell in for the greater part of the fighting, holding their own well against considerable numbers until B Troop, who are acting as reserves with the wagons, went to their support. The natives then fell back, six men coming down before the rifles of B Troop and were chased by C Troop, B Troop being ordered to retire. The natives were followed by C Troop for some distance and considerable numbers were killed, the total number knocked over being about sixty. In the skirmish, one man of C Troop, Lucas by name, was wounded by an assegai in the shoulder and a bullet in the leg. After laager was formed for breakfast, the day pickets reported strong bodies of natives advancing on the right flank, whereupon B Troop fell in, mounted, but on their appearance, the natives retreated and disappeared.

The diary later records how John Selous and another went out to see if they could find a trace of Captain Williams. John Selous returned to report having found a blood spoor which he believed was that of William's horse. A party of fourteen men from B Troup under Captain Borrow[9] went out. They found the spoor and followed it until sunset, but without result. Next morning, John Selous and a native went to follow the spoor.

Meantime Scouts were on ahead in search of the enemy and from time to time shots were heard. Just as preparations have been made to move on 31 October, the alarm was sounded. Captain White had sent back a note to say that a large force of the enemy had been seen a mile or so ahead advancing on the laager. The enemy, however, did not appear and the Columns moved on and laagered for the night within range of a kopje where the enemy had been last seen.

The diary records, The seven-pounder was brought to bear on the hill and the shells were seen to burst among large bodies of natives, who turned and fired on the bursting shells and then ran for their lives.

The night passed without an attack and on the following morning, 1 November, the Columns again moved on, keeping to the open country and skirting a large track of bush on the right of the line of march. At about 12.15pm a halt was made for lunch. But more pressing matters soon engaged the attention of the troops.

All horses and oxen were let loose and cooking was going on when the natives were seen in strong force on the right flank.[10] The seven-pounder opened up on them, but not being sufficient to keep them in check, all hands were ordered to the wagons and a heavy fire was opened. But the attack being quite unexpected, there was a certain amount of confusion. The whole strength of the enemy’s force was thrown on the one face of our laager where A Troop were stationed. A heavy fire was kept up by the men, the Gardner, one Maxim and the seven-pounder joining in. But the main danger lay in getting our horses cut off. They had been brought up to the rear when the firing was going on under cover of the Victorian laager, but on coming near the firing, they all bolted in the direction where the Matabele lay, on our left face. The enemy seeing the advantage of cutting off our means of transport, threw out arms to surround them, but their attempts were repeatedly frustrated by the steady fire of Maxim’s and Gardner’s and Captain Borrow, galloping out of the laager, pluckily turned the horses in the direction of safety in the valley stretching out behind the Victorian laager.[11] Ultimately all were brought into the laager, but by this time the enemy found our fire too hot and had turned back into the bush. All this time the oxen had been kept in our rear but were protected by the fire of our guns.

After this, a troop of dismounted Victorians went out into the bush and engaged the enemy, doing good work and keeping up a steady fire, ‘til finally they overcame opposition. Then they returned to camp.

The diary tells us that the retreat of the Matabele was hastened after this attack which was practically over in an hour. Then began preparations for a night attack. Altogether, it was a lucky escape, remembering that the enemy's attack had not been expected.

It was found that our loss amounted to one man killed (Thompson C Troop) three men badly wounded (Carey, Silbert, Calcroft) and four slightly wounded (Crewe, Barnard, Wack and a man unnamed in the Victoria laager) We lost three or four horses and the estimate of the enemy’s loss varied from 500 to 1,000 men. At any rate their loss was very heavy in spite of the fact that only one face of our laager was attacked. The Victoria laager was in the rear and was comparatively little exposed, so that it may be estimated that only a quarter of our force was engaged.

The men were in readiness all night, but the expected attack did not materialise. Subsequently the column moved on towards Ntaba Induna. The laager, six miles distant, was in fine open country in a commanding position. The night passed quietly. Trooper William Arthur Carey and Trooper Julius Silbert, however, died from their wounds and were buried next morning just before the Column moved on. The date was 3 November. Before they had gone more than two miles, the alarm was sounded and laager was formed.

The alarm was caused through C Troop firing on natives who appeared in strong force on Ntaba Induna and in the bush around. The seven-pounder was opened without effect, but the Scouts and C Troop silenced the fire of the natives, who did not appear anxious to meet us again. About lunch time Fairbairn came into camp from Bulawayo and reported that the kraal was on fire and that Lobengula had fled northwards. It was then decided to trek on and ‘horses in’ was sounded, the Column moving off at 1pm.

     The powder magazine and wagon shed blown up after Lobengula retreated northwards from his capital

Under the protection of strong flanking and advance parties, the wagons moved round the hill and passing through some thick bush where thousands of natives could have been concealed, emerged into open country, studded with native kraals.

 When night fell the victors were in laager seven miles from Bulawayo. In the morning they pushed on, negotiating with considerable difficulty the steep drift on the Umgusa river, being delayed about an hour. And still no sign of the enemy. At 2pm the Column was in Bulawayo in laager on either side of Colenbrander’s store.

  Johan Colenbrander’s store where the Salisbury and Victoria Columns camped at the end of their march to Bulawayo on 4   

  November 1893

The diary states, On arrival it was found that the greater part of Bulawayo had been burned and the remainder was still in flames. The King’s kraal had been completely destroyed and no natives were to be seen. Corporal Samuel Calcroft died after the column arrived.

From that point we read how the men of the column settled themselves in to await the arrival of the Southern Column under Colonel Goold-Adams. The men from the South arrived about 11 November and thereafter, the diary tells of the preparations that were made for the pursuit of Lobengula, the stage of the campaign at which occurred the loss of the Wilson patrol in circumstances which are narrated elsewhere in the souvenir. Further on we read, Lobengula sent in word to Dr Jameson that he and his men were all sick and were anxious to give themselves up, also asking what to do. Dr Jameson replied instructing him to give himself up to Major Forbes, who was then on patrol.

The diary of military operation ends here, for Dr Jameson had appointed the writer as storeman and in charge of all the stores belonging to the Chartered Company and, the less spectacular, but nonetheless important work of establishing the country has begun.

Reference

Occupation of Matabeleland: A Souvenir. November 1933